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 Abstract 
The increased possibilities for geographical separation of the production process have given 
rise to a growing interest for trade in intermediate goods in the international trade literature. 
Thanks to trade in parts and components, but also in services and other immaterial products, 
developing countries have been able to enter the global trade scene to a greater extent than 
before. This paper analyzes the trade effects of the customs union between the European 
Union and Turkey, implemented in 1996. Specifically, a set of gravity equations are used in 
order to analyze how the intra-EU export flows of intermediate- vis-à-vis other goods have 
been affected. That is, how the integration of Turkey into the EU market has affected the trade 
flows between a selection of Southern- and Northern EU member countries. The results reveal 
that the intra-EU exports of the Southern EU have experienced a greater reduction in its 
exports compared to the Northern EU, especially in exports of other than intermediate goods.  
Keywords: Intermediate goods, customs union, gravity equation, internal trade effects, 
technological differences, European Union, Turkey.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
In late December 1995, the European Union (EU) and Turkey signed a customs union (CU) 
agreement with each other. The agreement, in effect since January 1996, implied that the EU 
and Turkey removed their respective tariffs and levies on imports of manufactured goods 
between each other. The agreement also covers trade in processed agricultural products
1
, but 
it does not cover agricultural products, nor does it cover trade in services. In addition to the 
tariff removal, Turkey was obliged to adopt the EU’s common external tariff (which they did 
in 2001) on imports from the rest of the world (i.e. countries outside the EU), to further 
integrate Turkey as part of the EU market. Thus, countries outside the EU were given the 
same access to the Turkish market as they were given to the EU market. The CU led Turkey 
to become a relatively open economy, at least in non-agricultural products. Furthermore, the 
CU has helped to remove technical barriers to trade, since Turkey agreed to align its product 
quality standards to those of the EU.  
The trade effects of the EU-Turkey customs union have been the concern of many papers (see 
for example Harrison et. al (1997), Mercenier and Yeldan (1997), Adam and Moutos (2008), 
Lejour and de Moij (2004)). Previous literature has concerned the welfare effects (primarily 
for the Turkish economy) as well as the trade effects, but little attention has been given to the 
effect on intermediate goods trade vis-à-vis trade in other types of goods.  
Trade in intermediate goods has attracted much attention recently (see for example Baldwin 
(2012) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)). Improved possibilities for firms to 
offshore certain parts of their production process to remote locations have led to 
internationalized production chains. Firms seek to reap the benefits of differences in factor 
endowments (and thus costs) between countries, and it is possible that such a setting is 
prevalent in the EU-Turkey case. Firms in technologically sophisticated countries, such as a 
number of the EU member countries, could gain from offshoring the parts of their production 
that requires lower technological sophistication to countries where the costs for the required 
(lower technological) inputs are lower, such as Turkey (who has a relatively lower 
technological level index value than some EU countries (Adam and Moutos, 2008, p. 697)). It 
is therefore interesting to examine whether there are specific effects to expect from forming a 
                                                 
1
 See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/food/eu-market/processed-products/ for a description of which 
agricultural products that are considered as processed. 
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customs union between technologically different countries, for example if intermediate goods 
trade is affected differently compared to trade flows of other goods. This paper aims to 
account for the CU’s effect on the respective trade flows of intermediate- and other goods 
between the EU countries (and briefly between the EU and Turkey) from 1992 until 2008, i.e. 
how the CU has affected intra-EU trade. 
The next section of the paper will provide a review of previous literature concerning the EU-
Turkey customs union, but also trade in intermediate goods and the internationalization of 
production chains. The third section contains the theoretical framework for the analysis, 
including the theory behind the gravity equation. The data and method that will be used is 
presented in the fourth section, with the results and analysis presented in section five. The last 
section summarizes.   
2.  Background 
 
Turkey’s exports to the EU have experienced a stable increase from 1992 through 2008, with 
a more dramatic increase in the 21
st
 century, regardless of the state of the Turkish economy. 
Turkish imports from the EU, on the other hand, have been more sensitive to the country’s 
GDP. Figure 1 shows the development of the Turkish GDP and figure 2 shows the 
development of the trade between Turkey and the EU, from 1992 to 2008.  
 
Figure 1. Source: The World Bank. 
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Figure 1. Turkish GDP, 1992-2008. 
Erik Dahlberg (2013), Effects of the EU-Turkish Customs Union on the Intra-EU Trade Flows, Lund University 
 
3 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Source: The World Bank. 
The earlier, ex ante, literature regarding the CU agreement in question has predominantly 
focused on the effects on the Turkish economy, primarily the welfare effects. Harrison et al. 
(1997) expected a positive welfare effect, whereas Mercenier and Yeldan (1997) expected it 
to be negative, unless further integration with the EU was implemented. While welfare effects 
of a customs union of course are important to study, the aim of this paper is to focus on the 
various trade flow effects of the CU and leaving the welfare effects to other papers.  
2.1 Trade effects of the Turkish integration 
 
Recent, ex post, literature on the subject has focused more on the trade effects, rather than 
trade’s effect on welfare, of the CU. Adam and Moutos (2008) use a gravity model to find that 
the trade effects of the EU-Turkey CU are asymmetric. In the initial stage, a number of 
countries are members of a free trade area, e.g. a customs union (such as the members of the 
European Union). When another country joins the union (such as Turkey did in 1996), the 
more technologically similar the initial member countries are to the joining country, the more 
they experience a drop in exports to the other member countries. Conversely, countries that 
are technologically dissimilar to the joining country, do not experience the same drop in 
exports to other countries within the customs union.  
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Figure 2. Turkish total trade with the EU, 1992-2008. 
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Adam and Moutos (2008) use 24 OECD countries, and divide them into four regions: 
Northern EU, Southern EU, Turkey, and the rest of the world. They then turn to investigate 
the effects on the trade flows between the three former regions, over the years 1988-2004. 
They find that both the Southern EU’s and the Northern EU’s exports to Turkey increased 
thanks to the customs union, and that Turkish exports to them both also increased. However, 
the Southern EU’s exports to the Northern EU decreased, whereas the effect on the Northern 
EU’s exports to the Southern EU was insignificant.  
In addition to this, a technology index (mentioned in the introduction of this paper) ranking 
reveals that the countries in the Southern EU group are more technologically similar (i.e. have 
more similar factor endowments) to Turkey than the countries in the Northern EU group (who 
have the highest index ranking). In such a setting, the Southern EU countries initially have a 
comparative advantage in producing (and thus exporting) products of lower technological 
sophistication than the Northern EU countries. When Turkey, who has a lower technology 
ranking than the Southern EU countries, is integrated into the market, the Northern EU 
countries will import products of the lowest technology from Turkey instead of the Southern 
EU (since Turkey has a comparative advantage in such products). In other words, Turkish 
firms will compete with firms from the Southern EU to a greater extent than they will with 
Northern EU firms. As for the intra-EU trade, this means that the Northern firms will switch 
from Southern EU imports to Turkish imports to a greater extent than the Southern EU will 
switch from Northern EU imports. Hence, the effect of the expansion of the CU to include 
Turkey had asymmetric effects on the total exports of the initial members. This paper will 
analyze if one can see a similar development for the exports of intermediate vis-à-vis other 
goods flows (and if the effect is of equal size for both types of flows). 
2.2 Globalization and trade in intermediate goods 
 
A larger share of today’s international trade can be described as intermediate goods trade. 
Feenstra (2004) notes that rather than focusing on industries with different skill intensities, as 
the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model does, one should focus on the different activities within 
each industry. These activities, which require different factor intensities, make up the entire 
production chain for a certain product. Since the factor endowments are different between 
different locations (e.g. countries), it is desirable for a producer to locate each production 
activity in a location where the factor that is intensely required is abundant and therefore 
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cheaper. Activities of a particular industry are traded between countries – intermediate goods 
trade.  
Prior to the industrial revolution, it was costly and practically difficult (impossible) to 
fragment the production process (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). Transportation and 
coordination consumed both time and money. Although Adam Smith (1776) had noted that 
division of labor was cost- and time-effective, with the famous pin factory example (p. 11f), 
transportation- and communication costs kept geographical proximity between the factors of 
production a necessity. Production activities could be divided between workers, as long as 
they stayed under the same roof. In addition, producers had to be in close proximity to their 
consumers.  
2.2.1  Historical progress of intermediate goods trade 
The invention of the steam power engine revolutionized the conditions for industrial 
production. Railroads and steamships cut transportation costs, which is one of the two major 
obstacles to production fragmentation. However, communication still required geographical 
proximity (the telegraph was indeed invented in the mid-19
th
 century, but there were limits to 
its usefulness other than transmitting just basic messages). The new, cheap transportation 
favored large-scale production, which is very complex and therefore requires coordination. 
Hence, the industrial revolution led to a paradox, as Baldwin (2012) notes. While 
transportation costs were drastically lowered, production clustered into factories in industrial 
districts. Large-scale production and comparative advantages required coordination, which 
had not experienced the same technological improvement as transportation. The key to 
success for a country was to have a “deep” domestic industrial base. While production spread 
all over the (western) world, it still clustered in certain separate locations. Production 
fragmentation had to wait roughly one and a half century until the next revolutionary step was 
taken. 
In order to perform successful large-scale production, there is a need for a two-way flow of 
material, people, information etc. While the steam revolution lowered the transportation costs, 
the information- and communication revolution lowered communication costs. Improvements 
in information- and communication technology (ICT), in the mid 1980’s, made 
telecommunication reliable and cheap, alongside with improvements in computer power, 
software capabilities etc.  
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Since direct communication with remote locations became readily available, firms found it 
economical to disperse production activities into geographically remote locations, to exploit 
differences in factor prices. It is not unusual that production activities are “outsourced” to 
foreign locations. Often, firms in highly developed countries (with an abundance of high-
skilled labor) decide to outsource (offshore) activities that require low-skilled labor to 
countries where low-skilled labor is abundant. Hence, the richer countries of the world can 
combine the high technology at home with lower wages abroad (Baldwin, 2012). 
When the steps of a production chain are undertaken in different countries, the product of 
each production site (i.e. their part of the production chain and not the final product) is traded 
with the other countries in the production network. Such trade, in parts and components, but 
also services of different kinds, is known as intermediate trade, and it is generally regarded 
that trade in intermediates, as a share of world trade, is becoming increasingly significant (see 
for example Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Baldwin (2012)).  
This paper sets out to examine whether this is present for the EU-Turkish trade relations and 
if the CU agreement has had a different effect on intermediate trade compared to other kinds 
of trade – primarily for the intra-EU trade relations. 
2.3 EU-Turkish intermediate goods trade 
 
The role of intermediate goods trade in Turkey was investigated by Türkcan (2005). He found 
that its share (approximately 20% in 2000) in Turkish trade with nine selected OECD 
countries (of which seven are EU members
2
) had increased since 1980, whereas its share in 
Turkish trade with the rest of the world remained fairly stable. In addition, he also concluded 
that the determinants of such trade are of country-specific character (such as GDP or trade 
openness), rather than industry-specific character (such as returns to scale or advertising-to-
sales ratios).  
According to Kaminski and Ng (2006), Turkey has been deeply integrated into a network of 
production fragmentation (or a “producer driven network” as they call it), since the mid-
1980s. In order for a country to take part of such a network and benefit from a globalized 
division of labor, three key features need to be in place: macroeconomic stability, competitive 
                                                 
2
 Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The other two countries in his paper are 
the USA and Japan. 
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domestic markets (i.e. open to foreign competition), and well-functioning “backbone 
services” (e.g. road-, telephone-, Internet-, banking-, insurance- and legal system).  
It is only in the recent years Turkey has achieved to fulfill all three goals. The Turkish 
economy has been steadily growing in the 2000’s, as can be seen in figure 1. The CU opened 
up the Turkish market for competition from EU firms and it also provided aid for Turkish 
policy makers to pursue reforms of the country’s financial- and legal systems (primarily 
competition laws, for example to curb corruption) and it has led Turkey to adopt European 
quality standards. Hence, there is reason to believe that the trade in intermediate goods 
between the EU and Turkey has increased after the CU’s implementation. 
3.  Theory – the gravity equation 
 
The major theoretical foundation of this paper will be the gravity equation, which departs 
from a model of monopolistic competition. The use of the gravity equation was disregarded 
between the 1960’s (i.e. right after its introduction by Tinbergen in 1962) until the late 
1980’s, due to its lack of theoretical foundation at the time (Kepaptsoglou et al., 2010). The 
gravity equation performed well at explaining trade flows between countries, especially 
compared to other models of trade. However, the lack of theory behind it posed difficulties 
when one should interpret the results, and the gravity equation fell into temporary oblivion 
since one failed to make economical inferences from the statistical results. 
However, the emergence of new trade theories has led the gravity equation to return as a 
widely used method when international trade flows are analyzed. Increasing returns to scale, 
imperfect competition, and nation-level product differentiation are examples of such theories. 
This paper will primarily use the latter two as its theoretical foundation. 
The gravity equation in this paper takes its departure from the monopolistic competition 
model (see for example Feenstra (2004), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and Carrère 
(2006)). The model is characterized by a market with a large number of firms, where there is 
freedom of entry and exit. In addition, which separates the monopolistic market from the 
perfectly competitive market, each firm produces a unique variety of a differentiated product 
(i.e., the products of different firms are not perfect substitutes).  
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If two identical countries move from autarky to free trade, the monopolistic competition 
model predicts that they will start to trade with each other. Since each firm in the two 
countries produces a differentiated product, they will begin to export to the other country 
when trade is possible. Consequently, they will also face new competition in their home 
market, from foreign firms, and countries will specialize in producing different varieties. 
When trade is possible, it is profit maximizing for firms to produce unique varieties of a 
differentiated product, rather than producing the same variety within each country. Hence, 
countries both export and import products within the same industry. 
3.1 Border effects in the gravity equation 
 
If we develop the gravity equation, by leaving the simplifying assumption of no transaction 
costs, prices are no longer equalized across different countries (which they are when there are 
no transaction costs). The gravity equation in this analysis, with border effects, is based on 
that of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004). 
If one denotes exports of good k from country i to country j with   
  
, then   
  
 also denotes the 
total consumption of good k in country j, since all countries produce unique product varieties. 
Country         produces    products, which means that country j’s utility is given by 
(1)          
   
       
  
   
 
   . 
We assume that all products that country i exports to country j are sold for the same c.i.f. 
(cost, insurance, freight) price,    , in country j. The price for the same goods in country i are 
  , and are free from transaction costs (since they are not exported). Furthermore, the price in 
country j is related to the price in country i in the following way:          , where      .  
    is the transportation costs that occur when a good is exported from country i to country j. 
It can be viewed as     units of a good must be shipped for one unit of the good to arrive to 
the market in country j. This is commonly referred to as “iceberg transportation costs”3, since 
        units of the good are shipped from country i, but     “melts” away during the 
transportation so that only one unit of the good arrives in country j.  
                                                 
3
 Formulation introduced by Samuelson (1952). 
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Since the prices in country j are equal across all imported products from country i, the 
consumption of country i’s products in country j is equalized over all products         . 
Hence,   
       and the utility function (1) can be simplified into 
(2)             
   
       
. 
It is assumed that trade is balanced, so the representative consumer of country j maximizes the 
utility function (2) subject to his budget constraint (   is aggregate income in country j): 
(3)                 . 
Thus, one can obtain the demand for each product,    , when the representative consumer 
maximizes (2) subject to (3): 
(4)             
  
       , 
where    is the price index of country j which is defined as 
(5)              
      
    
       
. 
The gravity equation including border effects (specifically transport costs) can then be 
expressed as:  
(6)     
    
  
 
   
    
 
   
. 
Equation (6) states that the trade between two countries i and j depends on their respective 
GDP’s and their respective price indexes as well as transaction costs.   
3.1.1 Distance and other “fixed” variables in the gravity equation 
There is, however, a problem related to the usage of a gravity equation such as (6) (Feenstra, 
2004). Often, the variables    and    are estimated using official price indexes, which may not 
be an accurate reflection of the actual border effects between two countries. Price indexes are 
unlikely to reflect other important transaction costs apart from transportation costs, such as 
the time it takes for shipments to reach their destination or risks related to the 
macroeconomic- and/or monetary environment of a country’s trading partner. 
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One solution to such a problem is to measure the difference between the price of country i’s 
good when it is sold in country i to the price when the same good is sold (exported) in country 
j, i.e.    , by including distance and other factors into the “iceberg cost”: 
(7)                     . 
In (7),       represents the logarithmized distance between country i and country j, where ρ is 
the coefficient that determines the effect of the distance on the logarithmized transaction cost, 
     . All other transaction costs, or “barrier-to-trade” costs, between the two specific 
countries i and j are captured in    , whereas     is the random error (Feenstra, 2004). 
Carrère (2006), who develops a similar gravity equation as Feenstra, suggests that in order to 
properly account for the “barrier-to-trade” function between two countries, one should 
account for the distance between the two countries, whether or not they share a common 
border, if they are landlocked and also the level of infrastructure in the two countries. The 
distance effect on the trade has thus been extended to include additional measures which are 
likely to affect the level of trade between country i and country j.  
In sum, the theoretical foundation of the gravity equation relies on the assumption that the 
economic mass (i.e. GDP) of the trading partners enhances trade, whereas the distance (both 
geographical and other types) between the countries has an opposite effect. 
3.1.2 Customs unions in the gravity equation 
The gravity equation is often used as a tool to analyze the effects of various types of regional 
trade agreements (RTA’s), including CU agreements. Most of the theory regarding RTA’s 
and the gravity equation concerns trade- creation or diversion, which is not the concern of this 
paper. Often, the gravity equation is used to ex-post assess the effects of a RTA on the 
member countries vis-à-vis non-members, e.g. the RTA’s effect on trade between the 
members compared to its effect on the members’ trade with non-members. This paper 
analyzes the CU’s effect on different types of goods’ trade flows within a RTA. The 
perspective of the CU’s trade effect on non-member countries is beyond the scope of this 
paper and is thus absent.    
However, there is no reason to believe that the gravity equation is unsuitable for an analysis 
such as this paper’s. As Carrère (2006, p. 228) puts it, “…, the gravity equation suggests a 
“normal” level of bilateral trade for the sample. Then, dummy variables can be used to 
capture the “atypical” levels resulting from an RTA”. The gravity equation should thus serve 
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the purpose of assessing the CU’s effect on the trade flows between countries within the 
union.  
As mentioned earlier in this paper, Türkcan (2005) found that country-specific variables are 
the most appropriate for analyzing intra-industry trade in both final- and intermediate goods. 
This further supports the choice of the gravity equation with country-specific variables as the 
theoretical framework for analyzing the trade flow effects of the CU between the EU and 
Turkey. The specifics on how this is done in the current paper will be presented in the 
following section.  
4.  Data/Method 
 
In order to assess the effect of the CU on the intra-EU trade, several gravity equations will be 
estimated and compared. The trade effects of the CU will, in the first step, be broken down 
into three different regressions, in order to separate the effects of the CU on the three 
respective intra-EU trade flows of total-, intermediate- and other goods. 
4.1 Data and variables 
 
The 15 sample countries are Turkey and the 14 earliest members of the European Union
4
, 
except Luxembourg (due to lack of sufficient data). The trade data is collected from the 
OECD’s STAN Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and End-use Category, where the value 
of bilateral total- and intermediate exports data of each country is available. The export flow 
of other goods is the difference between total exports and intermediate exports, and contains 
household consumption-, capital- and mixed end-use goods.  
The sample period is 1992 to 2008, in order to provide reference years prior to the CU (which 
was implemented in 1996), as well as a sufficient number of “post-CU” years. Each sample 
country has 14 trading partners per year, which gives a total of 3570 observations per trade 
flow (15 exporting countries * 14 importing countries (for each exporter) * 17 years). Since 
there are three different trade flows included (total, intermediate and other), the total number 
of export observations amounts to 10710. 
                                                 
4
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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Data for each country’s GDP and GDP per capita is extracted from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance database. The economic mass of 
each bilateral trading pair is then calculated as the product of the countries’ GDP’s, for each 
year. In other words, the (three) export flows from country i to country j in year t is matched 
with the product of country i’s GDP and country j’s GDP in year t. The difference in GDP per 
capita is the absolute difference between the countries’ GDP per capita, for each specific year. 
In addition to the trade- and mass variables, the CU is represented by a dummy variable, 
which takes the value of one from the year 1996 and onwards, and zero for the years prior to 
the implementation of the CU (i.e. 1992-1995).  
In 2005, the EU and Turkey initiated negotiations for full Turkish membership of the 
European Union. According to Özdemir (2010), trade between Turkey and the EU increased 
dramatically after the accession negotiations started, rather than as an effect of the CU nine 
years earlier. A dummy variable (which takes the value of one from 2005 and onwards, zero 
otherwise), is therefore included in order to control for the potential effects of the accession 
negotiations. If the accession negotiations had a significant effect on EU-Turkish trade, not 
including it in the regression would lead to a biased estimate of the CU’s effect. 
Lastly, eight dummy variables are included in order to identify each export flow (North-
North, South-South, North-South, South-North, North-Turkey, South-Turkey, Turkey-North 
and Turkey-South). For example, the North-North dummy takes the value of one if both the 
exporter and the importer are from the Northern EU, zero otherwise. If the exporter is from 
the Northern EU and the importer is from the Southern EU, the North-South dummy takes the 
value of one, zero otherwise, and so forth.  
These dummy variables will be interacted with the CU- and the accession negotiations 
variables which enables one to identify how each of the eight export flows has been affected 
by the CU and the accession negotiations. This will be thoroughly discussed in section 4.2.3. 
The division of the EU countries into North and South follows Adam and Moutos’ (2008) 
technological specification. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are not only geographically 
located in the Southern Europe, they are also the countries with the lowest technology index 
(Adam and Moutos, 2008, p. 697). Furthermore, the figure in the current paper’s appendix A 
reveals that they have the lowest GDP per capita in the sample (except for Turkey).  
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Hence, the Southern EU consists of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, whereas the Northern 
EU consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. There will thus be three regions in the analysis: the 
Northern EU, the Southern EU, and Turkey. 
4.2 Empirical specification 
 
The gravity equations take the following form in the empirical analysis: 
(8)                                                                 
                                       . 
 Variable Description 
         k (total, intermediate or other) exports from country i to country j in year t. 
   Constant. 
          The product of country i’s and country j’s GDP in year t. 
          The absolute difference between country i’s and country j’s GDP per capita in year t. 
      Interaction variable. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CU is in effect, 0 otherwise, 
multiplied with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the trade flow is between region I and 
region J, zero otherwise. 
            Interaction variable. Dummy variable equal to 1 if accession negotiations are 
initiated, 0 otherwise, multiplied with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the trade flow is 
between region I and region J, zero otherwise. 
     Fixed bilateral effects between country i and country j. 
   Time effect for year t. 
       Error term for country i and country j in year t. 
 
In order to estimate and compare the CU’s effect on the intra-EU trade flows, three separate 
regressions of (8) will be estimated (the results will be presented in section 5). The dependent 
variable in the first regression is total exports. Hence, we will obtain an estimation of the 
effect of the CU on the total trade flow between the Northern EU and the Southern EU, using 
the other trade flows (i.e. Northern EU-Turkey, Southern EU-Turkey, intra-Northern EU and 
intra-Southern EU) as benchmarks. The first regression is thus: 
                                                                                .  
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The subscript “TOT” indicates total exports. In the second regression, the right hand side of 
the equality sign will remain unchanged, but the dependent variable will be the export flow of 
intermediate goods instead of the total export flow: 
                                                                                .  
Accordingly, the third regression estimates the CU’s effect on the trade flow of other goods: 
                                                                                .   
After estimating these three regressions, one is able to compare the coefficient of the CU 
variable, i.e.   , in each regression. Hence, it is possible to see how the CU has affected the 
trade flow of intermediate goods, compared to the trade flow of other goods, between the 
Northern- and the Southern EU. The results of the total trade flows will also be presented, in 
order to highlight the CU’s “general” trade effect. The main focus of the paper is although, as 
stated earlier, to analyze and compare the CU’s coefficient in the two latter regressions above. 
4.2.1 Bilateral fixed effects 
Equation (8) is a logarithmic regression with fixed effects, which will be estimated with 
robust standard errors. In using a fixed effects regression, all variables that do not vary over 
the sample period are controlled for; each pair of trading partners is assigned a unique dummy 
variable,     , which controls for any fixed parameter that might influence the trade between 
the bilateral trading partners. Hence, there is no explicit distance variable in equation (8) – it 
is controlled for by the bilateral dummies for fixed effects. The same goes for other constant 
parameters that might affect trade (i.e. through the price indexes of equation (6)), such as 
cultural-, historical-, and language ties. 
The choice of a fixed effects model for an analysis such as the one in this paper is suggested 
by Feenstra (2004). He concludes that a model with fixed effects perform consistently well 
compared to more customized methods, such as Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003). Since 
this paper do not specifically set out to analyze the trade effect of any constant parameter (e.g. 
distance), merely controlling for them, a fixed effects approach is more suitable thanks to its 
simplicity. Furthermore, the sample covers 17 years, which makes it unlikely that any 
“cultural” barrier to trade between the EU and Turkey has changed in a way that were not 
manifested in the implementation of the CU or the accession negotiations. 
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4.2.2 Time effects 
The inclusion of a time effect,   , controls for time-specific shocks on the trade flows within 
the sample. The intuition is to control for parameters that vary over the sample period that 
may affect the trade between the sample countries. For example, a global (or regional) 
economic slowdown is likely to have a negative impact on international trade. Not controlling 
for the time effects could in such a case lead to an undervalued trade effect of the parameters 
of interest. Adam and Moutos (2008) furthermore note that the emergence of China (and other 
developing countries) as a trading partner for the EU and Turkey is another “shock” that is 
controlled for by the time variable. This is especially important in the current analysis, since 
the rapid growth of the East Asian economies is assumed to have had a major impact on the 
international trade in intermediate goods (see for example Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006) or Baldwin (2012)). 
Mátyás (1997) compares two gravity models over the same dataset; one of them controls for 
fixed bilateral- and time effects, the other one does not. He found that the coefficients of the 
essential variables (GDP, distance, etc.) in the two regressions are much different from each 
other. Additionally, the majority of the fixed- and time parameters are statistically significant. 
Hence, by including fixed- and time effects, a panel data gravity equation (such as (8)), is 
more properly estimated. 
4.2.3 The customs union- and the EU accession variables 
In order to identify the effects of the CU an interaction variable, specified as follows, is used: 
              , where    is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the CU is 
in effect, zero otherwise. The starting year of the CU is 1996; the variable is hence equal to 
one from 1996 and onwards. The latter variable,      , is also a dummy variable, which takes 
the value of 1 if the trade flow is between region I and region J (the three regions being 
Northern EU, Southern EU, and Turkey), i.e. if    or    is equal to one . Hence, when the 
CU’s effect on the trade between region I and region J is estimated, the other trade flows (i.e. 
region I to region K, and region J to region K, as well as intra-regional trade flows) serve as 
control variables. For example, the CU’s effect on the trade between Northern EU and the 
Southern EU will be estimated in comparison with the Northern EU’s trade with Turkey, 
Southern EU’s trade with Turkey, as well as the intra-regional trade of the Northern- and the 
Southern EU. The coefficient on the CU interaction dummy variable,      , will thus be the 
coefficient of primary interest in the current analysis. 
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The EU accession negotiations variable,            , is developed in the same way as the CU 
variable:                           . The latter variable is the same as in the previous 
paragraph, whereas          is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the Turkish 
accession negotiations with the EU had begun (which they did in 2005), zero otherwise.   
5.  Results and analysis 
 
In the first part of this section, the results of the intra-EU regressions are presented (table 1). 
The second part breaks down the intra-EU trade in order to identify the CU’s effect on 
Northern EU’s exports to the Southern EU, and Southern EU’s exports to the Northern EU 
(table 2). The last part briefly summarizes the results of the CU in the same way as table 2, 
but with the addition of the exports from the Northern EU and Turkey, the Southern EU and 
Turkey, as well as Turkey’s exports to both EU regions. The complete result tables of the 
Northern EU-Turkey and the Southern EU-Turkey regressions can be found in Appendix B 
and Appendix C, respectively (they are not included in the main text since the analysis 
focuses on intra-EU trade).  
5.1 Northern EU-Southern EU trade 
 
Starting with the CU’s “general” gravity variables, it is evident that the mass variables are 
positively correlated with all the three trade flows, with high statistical significance. The 
larger the trading partners are, the more they trade with each other, as the gravity equation 
theory predicts. On the contrary, the difference in GDP per capita between trading partners is 
insignificant for all three trade flows. This holds true for the EU-Turkish trade flows as well 
(see Appendix B and Appendix C). 
The CU has had a negative effect on total intra-EU trade of 12.8% (          ). The effect of 
the EU accession negotiations’ effect is less, but significantly, negative: 9.3%. As for the flow 
of intermediate goods, the CU has had a decreasing effect of 10.3%, while the accession 
negotiations lowered it by 9.4%. Trade in other goods has also been negatively affected by the 
CU and the negotiations – a 15% decrease from the CU and an 8.8% decrease from the 
accession negotiations. In all three regressions, the coefficient on the CU variable is found to 
be significantly negative. Hence, it is concluded that the implementation of the CU has 
affected the intra-EU trade negatively.    
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Table 1. Trade between the Northern EU and the Southern EU 
Variable Coefficient Robust std. error t-value 
ln Total exports    
    
ln Mass .6597772*** .0269964 24.44 
ln GDP/capita difference .0032579
† 
.0053546 0.61 
CU North ↔ South -.1201128*** .0185921 -6.46 
EU North ↔ South -.0893669*** .0163151 -5.48 
    
Number of observations 3570 F(20,3340) 555.89 
R
2
 0.7143   
  
Variable Coefficient Robust std. error t-value 
ln Intermediate exports    
    
ln Mass .6125765*** .0297807 20.57 
ln GDP/capita difference -.0041181
† 
.006483 -0.64 
CU North ↔ South -.0976732*** .0193642 -5.04 
EU North ↔ South -.0900924*** .0188136 -4.79 
    
Number of observations 3570 F(20,3340) 473.35 
R
2
 0.6654 
    
Variable Coefficient Robust std. error t-value 
ln Other exports    
    
ln Mass .7335777*** .0326652 22.46 
ln GDP/capita difference .00793
† 
.0063169 1.26 
CU North ↔ South -.1395651*** .0254365 -5.49 
EU North ↔ South -.0845988*** .0212879 -3.97 
    
Number of observations 3570 F(20,3340) 376.18 
R
2
 0.7272   
    
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, 
† 
insignificant at the conventional test levels. Fixed 
effects regression, where the constant- and the time variables are not reported in order to save space. 
The results of table 1 furthermore suggest that the CU has affected trade in other goods more 
than it has affected trade in intermediate goods. Turkey has been integrated into the other 
goods market to a greater extent than it has been into the intermediate goods market. Since 
trade in services (i.e. a type of intermediate goods trade) was not covered by the CU, the 
findings are perhaps not very surprising.  
5.2 Asymmetric effects on the EU countries 
 
In order to enrich the analysis of the CU’s effect on intra-EU trade, table 2 presents the results 
of two regressions which are similar to those in table 1 but there are now two CU dummy 
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variables and two EU accession dummy variables; one where the dependent variable is 
intermediate exports and one where other exports is the dependent variable. These regressions 
will show whether the CU has had a similar or different effect on the two EU regions’ intra-
EU exports.  
For example, the intermediate exports regression will look as follows: 
                                                                                   
                              .  
In doing so, the analysis of the CU’s effect becomes more multifaceted, in comparison with 
analyzing the effect on the EU countries as a whole. Furthermore, following Adam and 
Moutos’ (2008) analysis, there seems to be a scope for asymmetric effects of the CU for the 
two EU regions.  
Table 2. Intra-EU trade effects 
Variable Coefficient Robust std. error t-value 
ln Intermediate exports    
    
ln Mass .6124332*** .0297238 20.60 
ln GDP/capita difference -.0041309
† 
.0064809 -0.64 
CU North to South -.0673666*** .0232587 -2.90 
CU South to North -.1280831*** .0252467 -5.07 
EU North to South -.0986839*** .0212958 -4.63 
EU South to North -.0800509*** .0254707 -3.14 
    
Number of observations 3570 F(22,3338) 432.88 
R
2
 0.6685   
    
Variable Coefficient Robust std. error t-value 
ln Other exports    
    
ln Mass .7334903*** .0328054 22.36 
ln GDP/capita difference .0079545
† 
.0064147 1.24 
CU North to South -.0302768
†
 .0318394 -0.95 
CU South to North -.2498805*** .0307647 -8.12 
EU North to South .0083364
†
 .0254627 0.33 
EU South to North -.1732435*** .0259197 -6.68 
    
Number of observations 3570 F(22,3338) 361.13 
R
2
 0.7329   
    
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, 
† 
insignificant at the conventional test levels. Fixed 
effects regression, where the constant- and the time variables are not reported in order to save space. 
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What is particularly striking about the results in table 2 is the CU’s asymmetric effect on trade 
in other goods. While the CU (and the accession negotiations) has not had any significant 
effect on Northern EU’s exports to the Southern EU, the reverse flow of goods has been 
decreased by 28.4% (whereas the accession negotiations decreased the Southern EU’s exports 
by 18.9%). Further asymmetry is evident in the flow of intermediate exports - the CU has 
decreased the Northern EU’s exports by 7%, whereas the Southern EU has experienced a 
decrease of 13.7%. The accession negotiations lowered the Northern EU’s exports by 10.4% 
(i.e. more than the CU), whereas the Southern EU’s exports were reduced by 8.3%. 
In sum, it is clear that the integration of Turkey into the EU market has reduced Southern 
EU’s exports to the Northern EU, while the reverse trade flow has remained relatively stable. 
Firms from the Southern EU have faced competition from Turkish firms when it comes to 
exporting other goods to the Northern EU. In relation with the statement mentioned in the 
second section of the current paper, it seems likely that the technological (i.e. factor 
endowments) similarity between the Southern EU and Turkey has had a diverting effect on 
the Southern EU’s exports to the Northern EU, in favor of Turkey’s ditto.  
Since the Northern EU has the highest technological development of the sample (and thus a 
comparative advantage in higher-technology products), they will import lower-technology 
products (in which they have a comparative disadvantage) from countries with lower factor 
costs for such products. Prior to the CU with Turkey, the Southern EU was the exporter of 
such products to the Northern EU (in the current sample).  
With the implementation of the CU, a country with a lower technological development than 
the Southern EU, Turkey, entered the market. Hence, Turkey has a comparative advantage in 
the lowest-technology products. Thus, the Northern EU will switch from the Southern EU as 
their provider of products of the lowest-technology standards, to Turkey (so will the Southern 
EU as well, to a certain extent). The Southern EU is, on the other hand, not likely to switch 
away from the Northern EU as their source of high-technology products, since the Northern 
EU still has the comparative advantage in such products. Hence, the Southern EU’s exports to 
the Northern EU decreases, while the Northern EU’s exports to the Southern EU remains 
more stable – just like the results in table 2 shows.  
Further research is however necessary to investigate the role of the differences in technology 
(one can conclude that differences in GDP per capita is not a significant determinant, in the 
current sample) and factor endowments, as well as why the CU’s effect on the flows of other 
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goods is stronger than the effect on the intermediate exports. Since trade in services is more 
present in intermediate- rather than other goods trade, one plausible reason for the latter result 
is that services were not included in the CU agreement.  
5.3 Analysis including EU-Turkish trade effects 
 
The aim of this paper was to analyze whether the CU between the EU and Turkey has had a 
particular effect on intermediate goods trade vis-à-vis other goods trade, for the intra-EU 
flows. Table 3 summarizes the results of the CU variables in all the regressions that have been 
run (i.e. both intra-EU as well as Turkish-EU trade flows). One cannot identify a distinct 
pattern in the CU’s effects on the trade flows, since the effects on each type of trade flow is 
different depending on which bi-regional export flow one considers.  
Table 3. Summary of the CU’s trade effects 
Trade flow Intermediate 
goods 
Other 
goods 
   
Intra-EU trade -10.3% -15.0% 
Northern EU-Turkish trade 30.8% 39.7% 
Southern EU-Turkish trade 58.2% 45.8% 
 
 
  
Northern EU to Southern EU -7.0% insignificant 
Southern EU to Northern EU -13.7% -28.4% 
   
Turkey to Northern EU 33.3% 34.7% 
Northern EU to Turkey 28.3% 44.9% 
   
Turkey to Southern EU 81.9% 46.4% 
Southern EU to Turkey 37.6% 45.1% 
   
 
The CU has had an expected negative effect on intra-EU trade – it experienced a larger 
decrease in other goods (-15%) than it did in intermediate goods (-10.3%). The major reason 
for this is the drop in Southern EU’s exports, compared to Turkey’s exports, of other goods to 
the Northern EU. In fact, the CU did not significantly affect the Northern EU countries’ 
exports to the countries of the Southern EU. Additionally, the reduction of the Southern EU’s 
intermediate exports was higher than the Northern EU’s ditto. Hence, the CU had a more 
negative effect on intra-EU trade in other goods than trade in intermediate goods. The major 
decrease appeared in Southern EU’s exports of other goods. 
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The Northern EU-Turkish trade flow experienced a higher increase in its trade of other goods 
(+39.7%) compared to the increase in intermediate goods trade (+30.8%, see Appendix B). As 
a whole, the CU had a similar effect on Turkish exports to the Northern EU for both 
intermediate- as well as other exports; whereas the CU increased Northern EU’s other exports 
to Turkey to a higher extent than it increased their intermediate exports. Hence, the CU had a 
more positive effect on trade in other goods than trade in intermediate goods, between the 
Northern EU and Turkey. The major increase appeared in the Northern EU’s exports of other 
goods. 
In the case of the Southern EU and Turkey, the opposite effect was evident (see Appendix C). 
The increase in intermediate goods trade (+58.2%) exceeded that of the increase in other 
goods trade (+45.8%). The major reason for that has been the increase in Turkish intermediate 
exports. While the CU’s effect on exports of other goods was similar for the two regions, 
Turkish intermediate exports to the Southern EU rose to a substantially higher extent than the 
increase in the reverse flow. Hence, the CU had a more positive effect on trade in 
intermediate goods than trade in other goods, between the Southern EU and Turkey. The 
major increase appeared in Turkey’s intermediate exports.  
6. Summary 
 
This paper has given an account of the intra-EU intermediate- and other goods trade effects 
after the CU agreement between the EU and Turkey of 1996. Firstly, the “overall” effect 
(table 1) showed that the CU had lowered the intra-EU other goods trade to a higher extent 
than it lowered the intermediate goods trade. The second step of the analysis broke down the 
trade flows in order to identify possible asymmetric effects for the two groups Northern- and 
Southern EU. It was showed (table 2), that the CU lowered the Southern EU’s exports to the 
Northern EU to a greater extent than it lowered the reverse flow of goods. The effect was 
especially strong for the flow of other goods, where the Northern EU’s exports were not 
significantly affected by the CU, whereas the Southern EU’s exports to the Northern EU 
dropped by almost 30%, compared to the Turkish exports of other goods (to the Northern 
EU). This paper presented the hypothesis that the CU’s effect was mainly due to the fact that 
the Southern EU’s level of technology (i.e. factor endowments) was more similar to Turkey’s 
ditto, compared to the Northern EU’s. Further research is however necessary in order to 
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explore whether that is actually the case, and if so, why it affected the exports of other goods 
differently from the exports of intermediate goods - this analysis clearly shows that it has. 
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Appendix A. 
 
     Source: The World Bank. 
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Appendix B. 
Trade between the Northern EU and Turkey 
Variable Coefficient Robust std. error t-value 
ln Total exports    
    
ln Mass .5629181*** .0278526 20.21 
ln GDP/capita difference -.0024885
† 
.0050093 -0.50 
CU Turkey ↔ North .3067781*** .0392135 7.82 
EU Turkey ↔ North .2293628*** .034751 6.60 
    
Number of observations 3570 F(20,3340) 583.62 
R
2
 0.6604   
  
Variable Coefficient Robust std. error t-value 
ln Intermediate exports    
    
ln Mass .5082129*** .030471 16.68 
ln GDP/capita difference -.0078824
† 
.0062025 -1.27 
CU Turkey ↔ North .2684341*** .0378139 7.10 
EU Turkey ↔ North .2811261*** .0338055 8.32 
    
Number of observations 3570 F(20,3340) 518.09 
R
2
 0.6023 
    
Variable Coefficient Robust std. error t-value 
ln Other exports    
    
ln Mass .6451585*** 035478 18.18 
ln GDP/capita difference .0004197
† 
.0060778 0.07 
CU Turkey ↔ North .3345655*** .0511228 6.54 
EU Turkey ↔ North .1798495*** .0435047 4.13 
    
Number of observations 3570 F(20,3340) 376.04 
R
2
 0.6878   
    
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, 
† 
insignificant at the conventional test levels. Fixed 
effects regression, where the constant- and the time variables are not reported in order to save space. 
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Appendix C. 
Trade between the Southern EU and Turkey 
Variable Coefficient Robust std. error t-value 
ln Total exports    
    
ln Mass .6154132*** .0290604 21.18 
ln GDP/capita difference -.002747
† 
.0050669 -0.54 
CU Turkey ↔ South .4169798*** .0598674 6.97 
EU Turkey ↔ South .2365228*** .0577796 4.09 
    
Number of observations 3570 F(20,3340) 568.69 
R
2
 0.6836   
  
Variable Coefficient Robust std. error t-value 
ln Intermediate exports    
    
ln Mass .5752202*** .0318329 18.07 
ln GDP/capita difference -.0092599
† 
.0062624 -1.48 
CU Turkey ↔ South .4588443*** .0628264 7.30 
EU Turkey ↔ South .1238337** .0522548 2.37 
    
Number of observations 3570 F(20,3340) 489.04 
R
2
 0.6369 
    
Variable Coefficient Robust std. error t-value 
ln Other exports    
    
ln Mass .6791193*** .0344923 19.69 
ln GDP/capita difference .0012963
† 
.0061096 0.21 
CU Turkey ↔ South .3768017*** .0812416 4.64 
EU Turkey ↔ South .3690454*** .0820692 4.50 
    
Number of observations 3570 F(20,3340) 373.69 
R
2
 0.6973   
    
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, 
† 
insignificant at the conventional test levels. Fixed 
effects regression, where the constant- and the time variables are not reported in order to save space. 
 
